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The End of Smuggling Hearsay: How 
People v. Sanchez Redefined the Scope of 
Expert Basis Testimony in California 
and Beyond 
Marissa N. Hamilton* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a well-settled principal that expert witnesses may give 
testimony in the form of an opinion, relying all or in part on 
sources that are hearsay.1 An expert may explain to the jury on 
direct examination the matters upon which the expert relied in 
forming that opinion, even if those matters would ordinarily be 
inadmissible.2 But when that matter is otherwise inadmissible 
hearsay, how much substantive detail may the expert relate to 
the fact-finder,3 and, further, how may the fact-finder consider 
such evidence in evaluating the expert’s opinion?4 
The California Supreme Court recently weighed in on these 
questions in People v. Sanchez and clarified the proper application 
of the hearsay rule as it relates to the scope of expert testimony.5 
The Sanchez court issued a strict bright-line test, putting an end 
to the prior paradigm in California: 
When any expert relates to the jury case-specific out-of-court 
statements, and treats the contents of those statements as true and 
accurate to support the expert’s opinion, the statements are hearsay. 
It cannot logically be maintained that the statements are not being 
admitted for their truth.6 
 
 *  J.D., Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law, May 2018. Thank you to 
Supervising Deputy Attorney General Scott Taryle and Deputy Attorney General 
Nicholas Webster for bringing the Sanchez case and its importance to my attention, 
Professor Scott Howe for his guidance and kind words of encouragement in writing this 
Comment, and the Editors of the Chapman Law Review for their hard work throughout 
the editing and publication process.  
 1 CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 2017).  
 2 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 802 (West 2017); see also People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 
329 (Cal. 2016). 
 3 Can the expert relate all substantive details or just the general kind and source? 
 4 Can the evidence be considered as substantive evidence or only for the limited 
purpose of evaluating the expert’s opinion? 
 5 See Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 324. 
 6 Id. at 334. 
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California courts have long paid lip service to the rule that 
experts may not “under the guise of reasons [for their opinions] 
bring before the jury incompetent hearsay evidence.”7 However, 
prior to Sanchez, California courts allowed experts to testify to 
hearsay statements as the basis for their opinions on the grounds 
that such statements were being offered for a non-hearsay 
purpose, and mitigated any potential hearsay problems with the 
use of a two-pronged test.8 California’s two-pronged test was an 
attempt to balance the “jury’s need for information sufficient to 
evaluate [the] expert opinion” with the “accused’s interest in 
avoiding substantive use of unreliable hearsay.”9 
Under this two-pronged test, the courts would “cure” hearsay 
problems by issuing a limiting instruction that matters admitted 
through an expert go only to the basis of the expert’s opinion and 
should not be considered for its truth.10 Thus, so as long as a 
limiting instruction was provided to the jury, the expert could 
testify to the hearsay details forming the basis of the expert’s 
opinion.11 In situations where the court found a limiting 
instruction not be enough to “cure” hearsay problems, the court 
could elect to exclude, under California Evidence Code section 
352, any hearsay with a potential for prejudice from the misuse 
of the hearsay statements outweighed the probative value of 
assisting the jury in evaluating the expert’s opinion.12 
Under California Evidence law, expert testimony concerning 
general background information, even if technically derived from 
hearsay, has generally not been subject to exclusion on hearsay 
grounds because experts assist the jury in understanding 
subjects that are sufficiently beyond common experience.13 By 
contrast, experts have traditionally, at least under common law, 
been precluded from relating case-specific facts to the jury, since 
the expert lacked independent knowledge of the facts.14 However, 
under the pre-Sanchez two-pronged test paradigm, there was no 
longer a need to distinguish between an expert’s testimony 
concerning background information and case-specific facts 
because the admissibility inquiry instead turned on whether the 
 
 7 People v. Coleman, 695 P.2d 189, 203 (Cal. 1985); see also People v. Linton, 302 
P.3d 927, 969 (Cal. 2013); People v. Nicolaus, 817 P.2d 893, 910 (Cal. 1991); N. Am. 
Capacity Ins. Co. v. Claremont Liab. Ins. Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 225, 244 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 8 See, e.g., People v. Montiel, 855 P.2d 1277, 1299 (Cal. 1993); People v. Gardeley, 
927 P.2d 713, 721–22 (Cal. 1996). 
 9 Montiel, 855 P.2d at 1299. 
 10 Id; see also Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329. 
 11 Montiel, 855 P.2d at 1299; see also Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329. 
 12 Montiel, 855 P.2d at 1299; see also Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329. 
 13 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 2017); Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 327. 
 14 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 327–28. 
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jury could follow the court’s limiting instruction regarding the 
nature of the case-specific out-of-court statements.15 The use of a 
limiting instruction was sanctioned because it instructed the jury 
that the hearsay contents could only be considered for the sole 
purpose of evaluating the expert’s credibility, and not for the 
truth of the matter asserted (i.e., not as independent substantive 
proof of fact).16 However, such limiting instruction may “never 
[be] tied to particular evidence, and the jury’s attention [may] 
never [be] drawn to specific hearsay information disclosed by 
expert witnesses which should only be considered as a basis for 
evaluating their opinions.”17 
What resulted was that the pre-Sanchez paradigm effectively 
amounted to a hearsay exception, even though no such hearsay 
exception existed.18 The blurring of this line between general 
background knowledge and case-specific facts has, arguably, 
opened the door to abuse; namely, expert witnesses being used as 
conduits to transmit inadmissible hearsay that does not 
otherwise fall under a statutory exception as assertions of fact to 
the jury.19 With such a liberal approach to admissibility, there is 
a risk that damaging inadmissible evidence, which would be 
unable to make its way to the jury through the proper channels, 
could be smuggled to the jury through the expert; or worse, 
parties may offer expert testimony simply to place such 
damaging evidence before the fact-finder disguised as expert 
basis testimony.20 The Sanchez rule curbs this potential for abuse 
with its bright-line rule prohibiting an expert from relating all 
case-specific hearsay statements forming the basis of the expert’s 
opinion, unless such hearsay statements fall under an applicable 
hearsay exception or are properly admitted independent of the 
expert’s testimony.21 
 
 15 Id. 
 16 See Montiel, 855 P.2d at 1299 (stating “matters admitted through an expert go 
only to the basis of [the expert’s] opinion and should not be considered for their truth”).  
 17 Id. at 1299–1300. 
 18 Cf. DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE – EXPERT 
EVIDENCE 190 (2d ed. 2010). 
 19 See Patrick Mark Mahoney, Houses Built on Sand: Police Expert Testimony in 
California Gang Prosecutions; Did Gardeley Go Too Far?, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 385, 
386–87 (2004) (arguing the Gardeley court erred in permitting the expert to relate 
otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence as the basis of the expert’s opinion, and the 
California Supreme Court missed a critical opportunity to emphasize a restrictive view of 
expert testimony and the importance of judicial gatekeeping); see also People v. Zavala, 
No. H036028, 2013 WL 5720149, at *58 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2013) (Rushing, J., 
dissenting) (stating that “rote application of the not-for-truth rationale to police gang 
experts has opened the gates to a veritable flood of incriminating hearsay”). 
 20 See KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, at 170–71. 
 21 See People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 333–34 (Cal. 2016). 
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While the Sanchez hearsay ruling does not change the basic 
understanding of the definition of hearsay, it does restore the 
restrictive common law approach in dealing with the scope of 
expert basis testimony, which has substantial implications for 
California trial practice both in criminal and civil contexts. 
California courts may no longer overrule a hearsay objection on 
the grounds that the hearsay is being considered solely for 
explaining the basis of the expert’s opinion, and experts may no 
longer be asked to assume case-specific facts and opine on the 
significance of such case-specific facts, if such facts have not 
been, or will not be, independently admitted into evidence. Since 
the paradigm of allowing a limiting instruction to justify the 
admittance of expert basis testimony is no longer tenable under 
Sanchez, trial counsel will be forced to shift their focus to 
ensuring they have established a proper evidentiary basis for 
admission of case-specific facts forming the basis of expert 
opinion testimony. This may include calling more witnesses to 
properly authenticate and introduce evidence that trial counsel 
wishes the expert relate to the jury. But if that’s not possible, 
trial counsel may be unable to present such evidence all together. 
This Comment explores the various trial contexts the 
Sanchez hearsay rule will likely affect. Part I discusses the facts 
of Sanchez and summarizes the California Supreme Court’s 
lengthy hearsay discussion and ruling. Part II explores both the 
criminal and civil implications of the Sanchez ruling in California 
trial practice. Part II also surveys various states that do not 
follow a restrictive approach to the scope of expert basis 
testimony, and exposes the problems surrounding such a liberal 
approach, thereby urging states to adopt and follow a 
Sanchez-like rule. Lastly, Part III examines the differences 
between California’s Sanchez approach and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence related to the scope of expert basis testimony. Part III 
also surveys the variances in interpretation and application of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 703, namely, the ongoing controversy 
as to how much, if any, substantive hearsay detail an expert may 
relate to the fact-finder as opinion basis testimony in both federal 
courts and legal scholarship. Finally, this Comment also argues 
that other state courts, as well as federal courts, should follow 
California’s restrictive Sanchez approach to hearsay as it relates 
to the scope of expert basis testimony. Sanchez was a criminal 
case and therefore also addressed Confrontation Clause 
concerns;22 however, this Comment focuses solely on the 
implications of the hearsay ruling. 
 
 22 See infra notes 38, 39, 76, 80 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT DECISION: 
PEOPLE V. SANCHEZ 
In the June 30, 2016 case, People v. Sanchez, the California 
Supreme Court considered the application of the hearsay rule as it 
relates to case-specific out-of-court statements offered as the basis 
of an expert’s opinion.23 The Sanchez court took the opportunity to 
“revisit and revamp” the proper application of California Evidence 
Code sections 801 and 802, specifically the application of the 
hearsay rule as it relates to the scope of expert testimony.24 The 
court issued a bright-line test in an attempt to restore the common 
law distinction between general background information and 
case-specific facts: “When any expert relates to the jury case-
specific out-of-court statements, and treats the contents of those 
statements as true and accurate to support the expert’s opinion, 
the statements are hearsay.”25 
A. Facts and Procedural History  
On October 16, 2011, the defendant, Marcos Arturo Sanchez, 
was charged with various criminal felonies coupled with gang 
enhancements, including active participation in and commission of 
a felony for the benefit of the Delhi gang.26 At trial, David Stow, a 
police detective, testified for the prosecution as a gang expert.27 
The expert testified generally about gang culture, in particular, 
the Delhi gang’s culture and pattern of criminal activity.28 The 
expert’s testimony then turned to the defendant specifically, 
regarding the details of defendant’s STEP notice,29 FI card,30 
 
 23 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 324. 
 24 John T. Brazier & Katherine Frank, Hearsay, the Experts Say!, L.A. DAILY J. (Nov. 
21, 2016), http://www.cgdrblaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Hearsay-The-Experts-
Say.pdf; see also Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 324. 
 25 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 328, 334. 
 26 Id. at 324. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 325.  
 29 STEP notices, or the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, 
are issued by police officers to individuals associating with known gang members. Id. at 324 
n.3. The purpose of STEP notices is two-fold; they provide, as well as gather, information. Id. 
at 324. The STEP notices provide notice to the recipient that they are associating with a 
known gang, the gang engages in criminal activity, and, if the recipient commits certain 
crimes with gang members, the recipient may face enhanced penalties for the crimes. Id. 
The STEP notices also gather information (such as the date and time the notice was given) 
and identify information (such as descriptions of tattoos, identification of the recipient’s 
associates, and any statements made at the time of the interaction). Id. at 324–25. 
 30 FI cards, or field identification cards, are small reports prepared by police officers 
that record the police officer’s contact with the individual. Id. at 325. FI cards record the 
date and time of the contact; personal information about the individual, associates, 
nicknames; and any statements made at the time of the interaction. Id. 
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previous police contacts, and prior police contacts while in the 
company of known Delhi gang members.31 
On direct examination, the prosecutor asked the expert a 
lengthy hypothetical in which the expert was asked to assume 
the out-of-court statements from the STEP notice, FI card, and 
previous police contacts.32 Based on these assumed out-of-court 
facts, the expert opined the defendant’s conduct indicated that he 
was a member of the Delhi gang and committed the crime for the 
benefit the Delhi gang.33 
On cross-examination, the expert admitted that he had never 
met defendant, was not present when defendant was given the 
STEP notice, and was not present during any of defendant’s 
other police contacts.34 Further, the expert stated that his 
knowledge of defendant’s prior police contacts while in the 
company of known Delhi gang members were derived solely from 
police reports and FI cards prepared by other officers.35 
The jury convicted defendant on all charges, including the 
gang enhancement charges.36 The Court of Appeal reversed 
defendant’s conviction for active gang participation, but otherwise 
 
 31 Id. at 325. The expert testified the defendant had received a STEP notice earlier 
in 2011, in which “the defendant indicate[d] to the police officer . . . that the defendant for 
four years had kicked it with the guys from Delhi,” and that the defendant “got busted 
with two guys from Delhi.” Id. The prosecutor questioned the expert about four other 
contacts that defendant had with police officers between 2007 and 2009. Id. The expert’s 
testimony relayed detailed statements from police documents, including: (1) that on 
August 11, 2007, defendant’s cousin, a known Delhi member, was shot while defendant 
stood next to him and that defendant grew up in the Delhi neighborhood; (2) that on 
December 30, 2007, defendant was with a documented Delhi member when that member 
was shot from a passing car by a rival gang member; (3) that on December 4, 2009, an 
officer contacted defendant in the company of a documented Delhi member and completed 
an FI card; and (4) that on December 9, 2009, defendant was arrested in a garage with 
two known Delhi members where police officers found a surveillance camera, Ziploc 
baggies, narcotics, and a firearm. Id. at 325. 
 32 The hypothetical question was:  
(1) a Delhi gang member, ‘who’s indicated to the police he kicks it with Delhi 
and has been contacted in a residence where narcotics and a firearm have been 
found in the past,’ is contacted by police in Delhi territory on October 16, 2011; 
(2) that gang member ‘grabbed something, and then grabs his waistband’ as he 
runs up the stairs into an apartment; and (3) he runs into the bathroom and 
police later find a loaded firearm and drugs on a tar outside the bathroom 
window. 
Id. 
 33 The expert reasoned that the defendant was “willing to risk incarceration by 
possessing a firearm and narcotics for sale in the Delhi’s turf,” and that the defendant’s 
conduct “created fear in the community redounding to Delhi’s benefit.” Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 326.  
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affirmed the criminal and other gang enhancement convictions.37 
The California Supreme Court granted review to clarify the proper 
application of California Evidence Code sections 801 and 802 
regarding the scope of expert witnesses concerning case-specific 
hearsay content in explaining the opinion basis.38 
B. California Supreme Court Analysis and Holding 
The defendant contended the expert’s testimony detailing 
descriptions of defendant’s past contacts with police officers was 
offered for its truth and, therefore, constituted hearsay.39 The 
Attorney General claimed the statements made by the expert 
were not admitted for their truth, but rather to aid the jury in 
evaluating the expert’s testimony, and therefore not hearsay.40 
The California Supreme Court provided an in-depth 
discussion on hearsay, from its historical common law 
development to its modern status as it relates to expert basis 
testimony.41 California Evidence Code section 1200 defines 
hearsay as “evidence of a statement that was made other than by 
a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to 
prove the truth of the matter stated,” and provides that hearsay 
is inadmissible unless it falls under an exception.42 The Court 
noted that, as a matter of practicality, the hearsay rule has 
traditionally not barred an expert from testifying about general 
background knowledge in the expert’s field of expertise, even if 
that expert’s general knowledge comes from inadmissible 
hearsay evidence.43 This is because “the common law recognized 
that experts frequently acquired their knowledge from hearsay,” 
and “to reject . . . some facts to which [the expert] testifies are 
known to [them] only upon the authority of others would be to 
 
 37 Id. The reversal was based on precedent that established the substantive offense 
of active gang participation required the defendant commit an underlying felony with at 
least one other gang member. Id. at 326 n.5. 
 38 Id. at 324. The court also granted review to consider the degree to which the 
Crawford rule, concerning the Confrontation Clause, limits an expert witness from 
relating case-specific hearsay content as the basis for the expert’s opinion when the basis 
involves testimonial hearsay. Id. 
 39 Id. at 326. The defendant further argued that admission of the expert’s testimony 
violated the Confrontation Clause because the statements were testimonial hearsay. Id. 
 40 Id. The Attorney General further contended that even if the expert’s statements 
were admitted for their truth, the expert’s statements were not testimonial and thus not 
in violation of the Confrontation Clause. Id. 
 41 See generally id. at 326–30. 
 42 Id. at 326. The Senate Committee comments to California Evidence Code section 
1200 provide that a statement “offered for some purpose other than to prove the fact 
stated therein is not hearsay,” and thus usually admissible. Id. 
 43 Id. at 327. 
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ignore the accepted methods of professional work and to insist on 
impossible standards.”44 
However, the court continued, “an expert has traditionally 
been precluded from relating case-specific facts about which the 
expert has no independent knowledge.”45 Generally, parties 
establish the facts on which their case relies by calling witnesses 
who have personal knowledge of the case-specific facts.46 Then, a 
party calls an expert witness to testify as to generalized 
background information to help the fact-finder understand the 
significance of the case-specific facts and to provide an opinion on 
what the case-specific facts might mean.47 
The use of hypothetical questions also honors the common 
law distinction between general background information and 
case-specific facts because under “this technique, other witnesses 
suppl[y] admissible evidence of the facts, the attorney ask[s] the 
expert witness to hypothetically assume the truth of those facts, 
and the expert testifie[s] to an opinion based on the assumed 
facts.”48 The common law strictly followed the rule that “[i]f no 
competent evidence of a case-specific fact has been, or will be, 
admitted, the expert cannot be asked to assume it.”49 
The Sanchez court acknowledged that the modern treatment 
of an expert’s testimony as to general background information 
and case-specific hearsay has become “blurred.”50 Recognizing the 
common law justifications51 for exceptions to the general rule 
barring disclosure of and reliance on otherwise inadmissible case-
specific hearsay—mainly practicality and judicial economy—the 
Legislature generalized these justifications in the enactment of 
 
 44 Ian Volek, Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 703: The Back Door and the 
Confrontation Clause, Ten Years Later, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 965 (2011) (quoting 1 
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN 
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 665 (2d ed. 1923)); see also Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 327. 
 45 Id. The court defines case-specific facts as “those relating to the particular events 
and participants alleged to have been involved in the case being tried.” Sanchez, 374 P.3d 
at 327. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 328 (quoting Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Gordian Knot of the Treatment 
of Secondhand Facts Under Federal Rule of Evidence 703 Governing the Admissibility 
of Expert Opinions: Another Conflict Between Logic and Law, 3 U. DEN. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 
5 (2013)). 
 49 Id. at 328. 
 50 Id. 
 51 These justifications included: (1) “the routine use of the same kinds of hearsay by 
experts in their conduct outside the court;” (2) “the experts’ experience, which included 
experience in evaluating the trustworthiness of such hearsay sources;” and (3) “the desire 
to avoid needlessly complicating the process of proof.” Id. at 329 (quoting KAYE ET AL., 
supra note 18, at 155). 
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the California Evidence Code in 1965.52 Under California Evidence 
Code sections 801(b)53 and 802,54 “reliability of the evidence is a 
key inquiry in whether expert testimony may be admitted.”55 The 
rationale in allowing an expert to rely on information that is of a 
type generally relied upon by experts in that field is that it 
“assures the reliability and trustworthiness of the information 
used by experts in forming their opinions.”56 Therefore, to explain 
his or her basis to a fact-finder, “an expert is entitled to explain to 
the jury the ‘matter’ upon which he [or she] relied, even if that 
matter would ordinarily be inadmissible.”57  
Naturally, courts have grappled with how much substantive 
case-specific hearsay an expert may provide to the jury and how 
the jury may consider this evidence.58 The California Supreme 
Court has long held that “an expert may not ‘under the guise of 
reasons [for an opinion] bring before the jury incompetent 
hearsay evidence.’”59 In an attempt to resolve this problem, 
California has followed “a two-pronged approach to balancing ‘an 
expert’s need to consider extrajudicial matters, and a jury’s need 
for information sufficient to evaluate an expert opinion’ so as not 
to ‘conflict with an accused’s interest in avoiding substantive use 
of unreliable hearsay.’”60 
The first prong involved the use of a limiting instruction to 
“cure” hearsay problems, whereby the judge instructed the jury 
that matters admitted through an expert should go only to the 
basis of the expert’s opinion and should not be considered for its 
truth.61 The second prong was applicable in instances where a 
limiting instruction may not be enough to “cure” the hearsay 
 
 52 Id. 
 53 California Evidence Code section 801(b) provides that an expert witness may 
render an opinion “[b]ased on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, and education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known 
to him at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that 
reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to 
which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter 
as a basis for his opinion.” CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(b) (West 2016); see also Sanchez, 374 
P.3d at 329. 
 54 California Evidence Code section 802 states that an expert “may state on direct 
examination the reasons for his opinion and the matter (including, in the case of an 
expert, his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education) upon which it is 
based, unless he is precluded by law in using such reasons or matter as a basis for his 
opinion.” CAL. EVID. CODE § 802 (West 2016); see also Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329. 
 55 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329. 
 56 Id. (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 2016) (Law Revision Commission Cmt.)). 
 57 See Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. (quoting People v. Coleman, 695 P.2d 189, 203 (1985)). 
 60 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329 (quoting People v. Montiel, 855 P.2d 1277, 1299 (1993)). 
 61 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329. 
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problems.62 In this situation, the court would apply California 
Evidence Code section 352, the balancing test that allows the 
court to exclude from an expert’s testimony any hearsay whose 
irrelevance, unreliability, or potential for prejudice outweighs the 
probative value of the expert’s testimony.63 
The court stated that, “under this paradigm, there was no 
longer a need to carefully distinguish between an expert’s 
testimony regarding background information and case-specific 
facts” because “[t]he inquiry instead turned on whether the jury 
could properly follow the court’s limiting instruction in light of 
the nature and amount of the out-of-court statements 
admitted.”64 The court “conclude[d] this paradigm is no longer 
tenable because an expert’s testimony regarding the basis for an 
opinion must be considered for its truth by the jury.”65 
The Sanchez court acknowledged that other courts have 
avoided hearsay issues entirely by finding that statements 
related by experts are not hearsay because they are not admitted 
for their truth, but rather “go only to the basis of [the expert’s] 
opinion.”66 However, the Sanchez court disagreed with this 
“not-for-truth” rationale, calling it a logical fallacy.67 The court 
reasoned that “[w]hen an expert relies on hearsay to provide 
case-specific facts, considers the statements as true, and relates 
them to the jury as a reliable basis for the expert’s opinion, it 
cannot logically be asserted that the hearsay content is not 
offered for its truth.”68 This is because “the validity of [the 
expert’s] opinion ultimately turn[s] on the truth of . . . [the 
hearsay] statement . . . if the hearsay that the expert relies on 
and treats as true is not true,” then “an important basis for the 
opinion is lacking.”69 
Further criticizing the “not-for-truth” rationale, the court 
noted that when an expert witness is not testifying in the form of 
a proper hypothetical question and evidence of the case-specific 
facts the expert is testifying to has not, and will not, be properly 
 
 62 Id. 
 63 See id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 329–30. While the court concluded the old paradigm is no longer tenable, 
the rationale the court provides suggests the old paradigm was never tenable to begin 
with. Thus, it is interesting to note that essentially nothing about the actual rule has 
changed, other than the courts implementation and opinion on how it should be applied 
and policed in practice. 
 66 Id. at 330 (quoting People v. Montiel, 855 P.2d 1277, 1299 (1993)). 
 67 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 332. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. (citing Williams v. Illinios, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2258 (2012) (Thomas, J., 
concurring)) (emphasis removed). 
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admitted independent of the expert’s testimony, “there is no 
denying that such facts are being considered by the expert, and 
offered to the jury, as true.”70 In this case, the jury was 
instructed that they “must decide whether information on which 
the expert relied was true and accurate,”71 while at the same 
time instructed that “the gang expert’s testimony concerning ‘the 
statements by the defendant, police reports, F.I. cards, STEP 
notices, and speaking to other officers or gang members’” should 
not be considered for their truth.72 
The court opined that “[j]urors cannot logically follow these 
conflicting instructions” because the jury “cannot decide whether 
the information relied on by the expert ‘was true and accurate’ 
without [first] considering whether the specific evidence 
identified by the instruction, and upon which the expert based 
his opinion, was also true.”73 To admit the case-specific basis 
testimony as nonhearsay, presented solely to aid the jury in 
evaluating the expert’s testimony, would be “to ignore the reality 
that jury evaluation of the expert requires a direct assessment of 
the truth of the expert’s basis.”74 
The California Supreme Court’s ruling75 restores the 
traditional common law distinction between an expert witness’s 
testimony regarding general background information and 
case-specific facts: “When any expert relates to the jury case-
specific out-of-court statements, and treats the content of those 
statements as true and accurate to support the expert’s opinion, 
the statements are hearsay. It cannot logically be maintained 
that the statements are not being admitted for their truth.”76  
The court expressly disapproved of its prior decisions that 
held: (1) an expert’s basis testimony is not offered for its truth; 
(2) a limiting instruction coupled with the court balancing 
the prejudicial effect versus probative value sufficiently 
addresses hearsay issues; and (3) an expert may testify to 
 
 70 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 333. 
 71 Id. (quoting Judicial Counsel of California Criminal Jury Instruction § 332 
(Oct. 2017)). 
 72 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 333 (quoting jury instructions used at trial). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. (quoting KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, at 179–80). 
 75 The California Supreme Court made clear the ruling in Sanchez does not change 
the basic understanding of the definition of hearsay. See Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 326. 
 76 Id. at 334. The court’s rule also went on to state that in the context of criminal 
cases, “[i]f the case is one in which a prosecution expert seeks to relate testimonial 
hearsay, there is a Confrontation Clause violation unless (1) there is a showing of 
unavailability and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination, or 
forfeited that right by wrongdoing.” Id. at 334–35. 
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case-specific out-of-court statements when no applicable 
hearsay exception applies.77 
The court summarized what an expert can do and what an 
expert cannot do in light of its ruling in Sanchez. An expert 
witness can “still rely on hearsay in forming an opinion” and can 
tell the jury “in general terms” that he or she did so by 
“relat[ing] generally the kind and source of the ‘matter’ upon 
which his [or her] opinion rests.”78 What an expert cannot do, the 
court explained, is relate case-specific facts asserted in hearsay 
basis statements as true, unless those case-specific facts are 
proven independently by competent evidence or are covered by 
an applicable hearsay exception.79 
The California Supreme Court concluded the admission of 
the gang expert’s hearsay testimony relating the case-specific 
statements concerning the defendant’s gang affiliations were 
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.80 Accordingly, the 
court reversed the findings on the defendant’s criminal street 
gang enhancements.81 
II. APPLICATION OF SANCHEZ BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE 
CRIMINAL GANG CONTEXT 
While Sanchez dealt with criminal gang enhancements, and 
thus addressed Confrontation Clause concerns, the court’s ruling 
on the proper application of the hearsay rule as it relates to case-
specific out-of-court statements offered as expert basis testimony 
applies equally to other criminal, as well as civil, contexts.82 
Section A discusses the extension of the Sanchez rule to other 
criminal contexts in California, including drug possession cases 
and Mentally Disordered Offenders (“MDO”) and Sexually 
Violent Predator (“SVP”) proceedings. Section A also looks at how 
other states apply the hearsay rule to case-specific out-of-court 
statements offered as expert basis testimony in these criminal 
 
 77 See id. at 334 n.13. 
 78 Id. at 334. 
 79 Id. For example, the court stated the length of a skid mark measured at an 
accident scene is a case-specific fact, while how skid marks are left on the pavement and 
the fact that the speed of the vehicle can be estimated based on the skid mark is general 
background information. Id. at 328. A witness who measured the skid mark at the 
accident scene could establish this case-specific fact. Id. The proper subject of an expert’s 
opinion in this situation could include that the car that left the skid mark had been 
traveling at about eighty miles an hour when the brakes were applied. Id. 
 80 Id. at 344. The court further held the police reports and STEP notice the expert 
relied upon in describing the basis of his opinion recited testimonial hearsay, and thus 
violated the Confrontation Clause. See id. at 340–44. The court held the FI card may be 
testimonial, but did not rule definitively on the issue. See id. at 342–44. 
 81 Id. at 344. 
 82 See infra Sections II(A) and II(B). 
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contexts. Section B explores how the Sanchez rule will likely 
affect civil cases in California, including product and strict 
liability, negligence, medical malpractice, personal injury, and 
valuation cases. Section B also discusses how other states apply 
the hearsay rule to case-specific out-of-court statements offered 
as expert basis testimony in these civil contexts. This Part also 
urges other states to adopt a Sanchez-like rule in determining 
the admissibility and scope of expert basis testimony. 
A. Other Criminal Contexts 
California courts have applied the Sanchez rule in criminal 
cases outside of the gang enhancement context, namely in drug 
possession cases and MDO and SVP proceedings.83 Other states, 
however, have not applied a restrictive Sanchez-like approach 
to the scope of expert basis testimony relating inadmissible 
hearsay in these criminal contexts, but should adopt a 
Sanchez-like rule.84 
1. Drug Possession  
In a criminal context, the Sanchez ruling will have a sizeable 
impact on drug possession cases. In a case decided shortly after 
Sanchez, People v. Stamps,85 a California Appellate Court 
extrapolated the hearsay rule in Sanchez and applied it to a 
criminal drug possession case. In Stamps, the defendant, who 
was convicted of multiple drug possession offenses, argued on 
appeal the trial court improperly admitted the case-specific 
hearsay testimony of a criminalist expert witness.86 At trial, the 
expert testified that her identification of the drugs in pill form 
was based solely on a visual comparison of the shape, color, and 
markings of the seized pills to those on a website called “Ident-A-
Drug.”87 The defendant argued the expert should not have been 
allowed to testify as to the case-specific contents of the Ident-A-
Drug website because the expert’s testimony was inadmissible 
hearsay the jury considered for its truth and used as direct 
evidence of the charged offenses.88 
 
 83 See infra Sections II(A)(1) and II(A)(2). 
 84 See infra Sections II(A)(1) and II(A)(2). 
 85 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 828 (Ct. App. 2016). 
 86 Id. at 829. 
 87 Id. at 830–31. The Ident-A-Drug website allows a user to enter the color, shape, 
markings, class, brand, or other descriptions on a pill in order to identify what 
substance the pill is likely to contain. See Therapeutic Research Center, IDENT-A-DRUG 
REFERENCE (Oct. 21, 2017, 7:56 PM), http://identadrug.therapeuticresearch.com/home 
[http://perma.cc/GR5Q-P5AN]. 
 88 Stamps, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 830. 
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The court discussed Sanchez in depth and held that “[i]t is 
[the] non-Crawford aspect of Sanchez that comes into play [in 
this case].”89 The court stated, “[a]fter Sanchez, reliability is no 
longer the sole touchstone of admissibility where expert 
testimony to hearsay is at issue” and, as such, “[i]ncorporated 
within the Sanchez rule is . . . a new litmus test . . . [that] 
depends on whether the matter the prosecution seeks to elicit is 
‘case-specific hearsay’ or . . . part of the [expert’s] ‘general 
background information.’”90 
Applying Sanchez, the court reversed the defendant’s 
conviction of possession of the drugs in pill form.91 The contents of 
the Ident-A-Drug website could not be independently admissible 
because the statements were hearsay,92 and the prosecution failed 
to offer any hearsay exception that would render the website 
statements admissible.93 Further, the court concluded the Ident-A-
Drug hearsay statements were “admitted as proof of the 
very gravamen of the crime with which [the defendant] was 
charged,” and clearly were case-specific facts, rendering the 
expert’s basis testimony inadmissible under Sanchez.94 
The factual circumstances in Stamps are by no means a 
one-time occurrence. In the 2014 California case, People v. Logan, 
the court was faced with a set of facts nearly identical to those in 
Stamps.95 In Logan, however, the California Appellate Court 
reached the opposite conclusion on the admissibility of the 
 
 89 Id. at 833 n.5 (stating “[t]he Crawford line of cases has no direct application here 
because the challenged hearsay was not testimonial”). 
 90 Id. at 833–34. 
 91 Id. at 836. In determining its reversal, the court also went through a harmless 
error analysis. The court determined the expert’s Ident–A–Drug website testimony was 
the only evidence that the pills indeed contained the drugs charged, and therefore could 
not be dismissed as “carrying little weight with the jury or being duplicative of other 
evidence.” Id. at 835. As an aside, the court affirmed the possession conviction of the 
drugs in crystalline form because the prosecution proved the chemical composition of the 
crystalline drugs through the expert witness, who performed a detailed chemical analysis 
on the crystalline drugs, and thus there was no Sanchez violation with respect to this 
evidence. Id. at 830. 
 92 Id. at 834 n.6 (stating that, based on the expert’s testimony, the Ident-A-Drug 
website “provided photographs of the pills, together with sufficient text to 
communicate that the photograph depicted a specified pharmaceutical,” thus “this  
combined content . . . constitute[d] an out-of-court ‘statement’ of a ‘person’ (the person 
who entered the information on the Web site) so as to bring it within the definition of 
hearsay” under California evidence law). 
 93 Id. at 834–35. 
 94 Id. at 835. 
 95 People v. Logan, No. A137403, 2014 WL 971444, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 
2014). In Logan, the defendant, like in Stamps, was charged with possession of drugs in 
both crystalline and pill form, and the expert ran a chemical analysis only on the drugs in 
crystalline form. Id. As for identifying the drugs in pill form, the expert visually identified 
the pills by entering the color, shape, and markings of the pills on the Ident-A-Drug 
website. Id. 
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expert’s testimony regarding the Ident-A-Drug hearsay 
contents.96 Instead, the court’s Ident-A-Drug testimony analysis 
focused on reliability of the website’s contents as being the 
“preliminary fact[or]” of admissibility.97 The Logan court opined 
the Ident-A-Drug hearsay statements were admissible because 
the website constituted a material that was “of the type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in [the expert’s] field,” and 
any challenge as to whether the expert’s identification of the 
pills was faulty went “to the weight of [the expert’s] testimony, 
not its admissibility.”98 
If Logan, or a factually similar case, was presented to a 
California court post-Sanchez, the Sanchez (and Stamps) rulings 
indicate the prosecutor would not be able to get the website 
contents before the jury unless the prosecutor called another 
witness to properly authenticate and admit the evidence, or it fell 
within an applicable hearsay exception. However, proper 
independent admission in most cases is unlikely given the 
anonymity of many Internet sources and courts’ general 
skepticism towards the reliability of Internet sources.99 
Other states, such as Arizona, Louisiana, Texas, Ohio, and 
Washington, have been generally consistent in allowing experts 
to testify to case-specific hearsay contents in the context of drug 
identification cases.100 In criminal drug possession cases, states 
 
 96 Id. at *4–5. 
 97 Id. at *3. The court determined that even though the expert did not know the 
particular details about the Ident-A-Drug website (e.g., the website author, who 
maintained the website, how often it was updated), it did not mean that the website 
contents were “speculative, conjectural, or lacking a reasonable basis.” Id. at *4. 
 98 Id. It should be noted the court determined that the admissions hearsay exception 
would, in this particular case, render the expert’s testimony regarding the Ident-A-Drug 
website contents admissible even if the court determined the trial court erred in allowing 
the testimony. Id. (stating the defendant himself admitted to the same evidence offered by 
the expert). However, what is significant is that the court found that disclosing the 
otherwise inadmissible hearsay basis was allowed, regardless of whether such evidence 
was properly independently supplied or whether an applicable hearsay exception was 
present. Id. 
 99 See People v. Stamps, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 828, 834–35 (Ct. App. 2016) (stating that 
courts continue to view the Internet “‘warily and wearily’ as a catalyst for ‘rumor, 
innuendo, and misinformation’” because “[t]he Internet ‘provides no way of verifying the 
authenticity’ of its contents”). The court went on to state, websites are unreliable because 
“[a]nyone can put anything on the Internet,” websites are not “monitored for accuracy and 
nothing contained therein is under oath,” and “hackers can adulterate the content.” Id. 
 100 See, e.g., Pineda v. State, No. 13-13-00574-CR, 2015 WL 5311237, at *4–5 (Tex. Ct. 
App. Sept. 10, 2015) (where the expert testified as to the chemical composition and weight 
of the seized pills based solely on a visual comparison on “Drugs.com”); State v. Murphy, 
28 So.3d 496, 499 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (where the expert testified as to the identification of 
the seized pills solely by a visual examination and comparison of the pills’ characteristics 
with a website called “Just Drug Identification”); State v. Garnett, No. 12CA0099-M, 2013 
WL 6021467, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2013) (where the expert testified as to the 
identification of the seized pills based solely on her use of the Ident-A-Drug database, 
instead of testing the milligram composition of the pills); State v. Sandoval, No. 1CA-
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should follow the restrictive Sanchez (and Stamps) approach to 
determine the admissibility of expert basis testimony when 
case-specific hearsay is at issue.101 Even putting aside issues 
related to unreliability of anonymous Internet sources, the 
admission of this kind of case-specific hearsay presents 
problems. As the Stamps court recognized, no special expertise 
is required to enter the characteristics of a pill onto a website 
and interpret the results provided by the website; so in 
instances such as this, the expert’s testimony “[does] not reveal 
any special expertise . . . beyond ordinary visual acuity . . . so as 
to make it an integral part of some larger opinion.”102 By 
presenting hearsay evidence solely through the expert, the court 
is “allow[ing] [the expert] to place case-specific non-expert 
opinion before the jury, with the near certainty that the jury 
[will] rely on the underlying hearsay as direct proof of the 
chemical composition of the pills.”103 In this type of factual 
circumstance, the expert is the only source of the identification 
evidence presented to the jury; the expert unavoidably becomes 
a “mere conduit” for the hearsay contents.104 Absent the expert 
testimony proffering the case-specific hearsay to the jury, these 
convictions likely would not stand.105 Therefore, other states 
 
CR14-0242, 2015 WL 1035236, at *6 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2015) (where the expert 
testified as to the identification of the seized pills based solely on the use of a website that 
law enforcement used to gather information about drugs and by a conversation with a 
non-testifying pharmacist at Walgreens); State v. Carter, 981 So.2d 734, 744 (La. Ct. App. 
2008) (where the expert testified as to the identification of the seized pills based solely on 
a visual inspection and comparison of the pill’s characteristics with a book); State v. 
White, No. 24174–2–III, 2006 WL 1778096, at *3–4 (Wash. Ct. App. June 29, 2006) 
(where the expert testified as to the identification of a seized pill capsule based solely on a 
conversation, in which the expert described the pill’s characteristics and logo, with a non-
testifying poison control center employee). 
 101 Note, I am not proposing that a chemical analysis must be conducted in order for 
there to be a conviction. Many states, including California, have explicitly held that a 
defendant may be convicted of drug possession without a chemical analysis of the drugs. 
See, e.g., People v. Camp, 163 Cal. Rptr. 510, 512 (Ct. App. 1980) (stating the court does 
not know of any case precedent that holds a chemical analysis of a substance is required 
for a possession conviction); People v. Sonleitner, 228 Cal. Rptr. 96, 99 (Ct. App. 1986) 
(holding that the fact the prosecution did not conduct a chemical analysis on the 
substance did not warrant a reversal of defendant’s conviction because “the nature of a 
substance, like any other fact in a criminal case, may be proved by circumstantial 
evidence”); White, 2006 WL 1778096, at *3 (“A chemical analysis of a suspected controlled 
substance is not essential to a conviction in a criminal trial proceeding . . . .”); Carter, 981 
So.2d at 745 (“An expert may identify a controlled substance without chemical analysis.”) 
(quoting Sterling v. State, 791 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)). 
 102 Stamps, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 831 n.2. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 See id. at 998 (“We conclude it is reasonably probable the jury would have 
acquitted [the defendant] of the charges based on pill possession in the absence of the 
Ident-A-Drug testimony.”). For other state courts which have concluded similarly, see, 
e.g., People v. Hard, 342 P.3d 572, 579 (Colo. App. 2014), which found the admission of 
the expert’s testimony regarding visual identification of the pills via “Drugs.com” was not 
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should follow California’s Sanchez hearsay rule in drug 
possession cases to uphold the intent of the rule against hearsay 
and curb convictions resulting largely based on inadmissible, 
unsubstantiated, and unreliable hearsay.106 
2. Mentally Disordered Offenders and Sexually Violent 
Predator Proceedings 
Another criminal context107 the Sanchez ruling will have a 
large impact on is MDO108 and SVP109 proceedings. In MDO and 
SVP cases, defendants convicted of serious crimes meeting 
statutory requirements face civil commitment, and prosecution 
experts are called to opine on defendants’ mental status and 
 
harmless because the expert’s “testimony . . . was the only evidence presented at trial to 
identify some of the pills” and thus the court could not “say with fair assurance that the 
erroneous admission of [the expert’s] testimony did not substantially influence the 
verdicts in this case.” 
 106 Many legal scholars agree the reason for the rule against hearsay is that hearsay 
is untested by cross-examination, and that prohibiting hearsay assists the fact-finder in 
ascertaining an accurate picture of the truth. See Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern 
Hearsay Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 367, 381–82 (1992); 
Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72 
B.U. L. REV. 893, 898 (1992). 
 107 While Mentally Disordered Offenders (“MDO”) and Sexually Violent Predators 
(“SVP”) proceedings are technically civil proceedings (because they determine whether a 
defendant is to be civilly committed), I am discussing them in the criminal context section 
because the proceedings are criminal in nature, since the MDO and SVP defendants are 
afforded many of the same procedural protections afforded to criminal defendants (e.g., 
the right to court-appointed counsel and experts, the right to a unanimous jury verdict, 
the right to testify in one’s defense, and the right to have the prosecution prove the SVP 
or MDO status beyond a reasonable doubt), and the adjudication of MDO or SVP status is 
related to the defendant’s criminal convictions. See Moore v. Super. Ct., 237 P.3d 530, 538 
(Cal. 2010). While this Comment focuses only on the hearsay implications of Sanchez, not 
the Confrontation Clause issues, it is still important to note that because MDO and SVP 
proceedings are considered civil proceedings, there is no right to confrontation under the 
state and federal Confrontation Clause in MDO and SVP trials, only a right under the 
due process clause measured by the standard applicable to civil proceedings is due to an 
MDO or SVP defendant. See People v. Nelson, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 183, 194 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(citing People v. Otto, 26 P.3d 1061, 1069 (Cal. 2001)). 
 108 The MDO Act, enacted in 1985 (codified in CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2960–81 (2017) 
and regulated in CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2570–80 (West 2017)) “requires that offenders who 
have been convicted of violent crimes related to their mental disorders, and who continue 
to pose a danger to society, receive mental health treatment during and after the 
termination of their parole until their mental disorder can be kept in remission.” In re 
Qawi, 81 P.3d 224, 227 (Cal. 2004) (finding the purpose of the MDO Act is to treat the 
MDO, while also protecting the general public from the danger posed by the MDO). 
 109 The SVP Act (codified in CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600–09 (West 2017)) 
“targets a select group of convicted sex offenders whose mental disorders predispose them 
to commit sexually violent acts if released following punishment for their crimes” and 
“confines and treats such persons until their dangerous disorders recede and they no 
longer pose a societal threat.” Moore, 237 P.3d at 536–37 (finding the SVP Act applies 
only to the “most dangerous offenders” who have been convicted of an enumerated 
sexually violent offense against two or more victims, and who has a diagnosed mental 
disorder that poses a danger to society of reoffending). 
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likelihood of reoffending if released.110 Often times, the experts 
are not the defendants’ treating doctors, and thus the experts’ 
testimonies rely entirely on the hearsay statements of treatment 
personnel and law enforcement.111 California Appellate Courts 
have applied the Sanchez rule to both MDO112 and SVP cases. 
In the post-Sanchez California Appellate Court case People v. 
Burroughs, the defendant appealed a jury verdict adjudicating 
him an SVP, arguing the court violated the Sanchez rule by 
allowing the prosecution’s experts to testify to a large amount of 
case-specific hearsay.113 The case-specific hearsay facts the 
defendant challenged included details about the defendant’s 
uncharged sex offenses and details about the defendant’s 
behavior while in state custody, which were gleaned from 
documents, such as police reports, probation reports, and 
hospital records.114  
The court, applying Sanchez, determined that much of the 
case-specific facts testified to by the experts were hearsay and not 
independently admitted at trial, nor did they fall within a hearsay 
exception.115 The details of the reports, testified to by the experts, 
were the only sources in the record that included the details about 
defendant’s uncharged offenses.116 Moreover, the experts’ 
testimony regarding the defendant’s uncharged offenses was 
described in “lurid detail” and was “exceedingly inflammatory.”117 
 
 110 See, e.g., Deirdre M. Smith, Dangerous Diagnoses, Risky Assumption, and the 
Failed Experiment of “Sexually Violent Predator” Commitment, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 619, 623 
(2015) (stating that “trial courts permit prosecution experts to offer diagnoses and 
predictions of risk” to support the experts’ opinions on whether to civilly commit 
defendants). 
 111 Id. at 696–97 (“[E]xperts testif[y] as to their diagnostic opinions of [defendant] and 
their assessments of . . . volitional impairment solely on the basis of information complied 
and furnished to them by government attorneys without ever having examined the 
[defendant]. . . . Government experts, in such cases, typically review criminal 
investigation reports and alleged victims’ statements (including information that would 
be inadmissible in a criminal proceeding) and utilize these accounts of conduct to identify 
‘symptoms.’”). 
 112 See, e.g., People v. Belin, No. E064815, 2017 WL 944210, at *10–11 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Mar. 10, 2017). The court applied the Sanchez rule in a MDO case, but found a reversal 
was not warranted because the expert was the defendant’s treating psychiatrist, and 
consequently much of the expert’s basis testimony was based on the expert’s own personal 
knowledge. Id. The small amount of case-specific hearsay facts testified to by the expert 
was inconsequential because defendant confirmed such facts during the defendant’s own 
testimony. Id. 
 113 People v. Burroughs, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 660, 677 (Ct. App. 2016). 
 114 Id. at 677, 680. The trial court allowed extensive testimony on these subjects on 
the ground that the content formed the basis of the experts’ opinions, and gave a limiting 
instruction that the jury consider the content for that limited purpose only. Id. at 678. 
 115 Id. at 684. 
 116 Id. at 682. 
 117 The expert’s hearsay testimony described in detail numerous sex offenses that 
defendant was not charged with or convicted of, including the repeated sodomy of a young 
boy and the use of a knife to penetrate a woman. Id. at 684. The expert’s hearsay 
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Thus, the court found the “improperly admitted hearsay 
permeated the entirety of [the defendant’s] trial and 
strengthened crucial aspects of the [prosecution’s] case.”118 
Because the admission of the experts’ case-specific hearsay 
testimony violated the Sanchez rule, and the court determined 
the admission was not harmless error, the court reversed 
defendant’s SVP commitment.119 
Pre-Sanchez, California courts in MDO and SVP proceedings 
have disagreed on the admissibility of expert basis testimony that 
is hearsay. Interestingly, regardless of the courts’ determination 
on this hearsay issue, the case-specific testimony still found its 
way to the jury one way or another. Courts that determined the 
testimony was admissible did so based on the “not-for-truth” 
rationale, i.e., the testimony is not hearsay because it is not 
coming in for the truth, but rather to evaluate the expert’s 
credibility.120 On the contrary, courts that determined the 
testimony was hearsay nevertheless admitted the testimony, so 
long as it was followed by a limiting instruction to the jury.121 
Neither of these outcomes are tenable post-Sanchez.122 
 
testimony also provided that defendant was a gang member and described bizarre and 
“lethal” behavior that defendant allegedly engaged in while in custody. Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. (holding there was a reasonable probability the jury would not have committed 
defendant as a SVP but for the hearsay evidence). 
 120 See, e.g., People v. Welch, No. H035567, 2012 WL 1107925, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Apr. 3, 2012) (allowing the expert in a SVP trial to testify as to the “hearsay” statements 
because the court determined the statements were not hearsay, as they were “not offered 
for the truth of the matters asserted but instead for the nonhearsay purpose of explaining 
the bases for the expert’s opinions”). 
 121 See, e.g., People v. Dean, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 478, 486–90 (Ct. App. 2009) (allowing 
expert basis testimony in SVP trial disclosing details of defendant’s hospital and 
institutional records because such testimony was coupled with multiple limiting 
instructions to the jury to consider the testimony only for the limited purpose of assessing 
the expert’s credibility). 
 122 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. While outside the scope of this 
Comment, it is interesting to note that it remains unclear whether the Sanchez rule will 
affect MDO and SVP trials (or any trials for that matter) when the proceeding is a bench 
trial, rather than a jury trial. The analysis in Sanchez, in criticizing the “not-for-truth” 
rationale, focuses heavily on the issue that juries cannot logically follow the conflicting 
instructions given to them (i.e., the jury must decide whether the information relied on by 
the expert was true and accurate, while, at the same time, not considering the evidence 
for its truth). See supra Section I(B). However, California courts have contemplated the 
idea that courts (judges) are able to correctly reconcile the conflicting ideas, and consider 
the expert’s hearsay testimony solely for the purpose of assessing the expert’s credibility. 
For example, in People v. Martin, 127 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174, 179–80 (Ct. App. 2005), a 
MDO bench trial, the court allowed expert testimony reciting hearsay statements from 
probation reports that were not independently admissible. The court stated that, because 
this proceeding was tried before the court and not a jury, “[w]e must assume . . . the 
court . . . considered the testimony . . . solely for the proper purpose of assessing the 
experts’ credibility, and not as independent proof of the facts contained therein.” Id. at 
180. Based on this logic, one could argue the Sanchez rule does not apply to bench trials. 
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Other states that have MDO and SVP proceedings or similar 
proceedings, such as Illinois, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Texas, and Washington, have somewhat consistently allowed 
experts to testify to the details of the hearsay contents forming 
the basis of the expert’s opinion.123 The impact of the Sanchez 
ruling is likely to be highly pertinent in MDO and SVP cases 
because, in many instances, expert opinion is the only evidence 
supporting commitment presented by the prosecution.124 MDO 
and SVP trials generally make liberal use of hearsay evidence 
embedded in expert testimony, and thus allow extrinsic hearsay 
evidence to be introduced to the fact-finder.125 The evidence is also 
often highly prejudicial because the prosecution experts, who are 
proffering opinions on the ultimate issue (i.e., whether the 
individual is dangerous and at risk of reoffending), relate hearsay 
details gleaned from, inter alia, institutional records, criminal 
reports, and conversations with treatment professionals that are 
graphic in nature.126 Allowing experts to relate inflammatory 
 
 123 See, e.g., People v. Swanson, 780 N.E.2d 342, 350 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (stating 
expert testimony recounting details from reports in an SVP trial are admissible because 
“[a]lthough reports made by others are not substantively admissible, an expert is 
nonetheless allowed to reveal the contents of the materials upon which the expert has 
reasonably relied to explain the basis of his or her opinion”); Commonwealth v. Miller, No. 
702-WDA-2016, 2017 WL 908315, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (allowing the expert to 
testify as to hearsay details on the grounds that the hearsay content was not being offered 
for its truth, but rather to show what information the expert relied upon in forming her 
opinion); In re Manigo, 697 S.E.2d 629, 633–34 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010) (holding the expert in 
a SVP trial could testify as to the details of the expert’s conversation with the defendant’s 
non-testifying treatment provider, even though it was hearsay, because the testimony 
went to the basis of the expert’s opinion); In re Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d 543, 
554–56 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015) (allowing the expert to testify as to the hearsay details of 
defendant’s past uncharged offenses from inadmissible reports to explain the basis of the 
expert’s opinion because a limiting instruction was given to the jury); In re Detention of 
Leck, 334 P.3d 1109, 1119–20 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (allowing the expert to relate 
hearsay details from a report because the report contents were used as part of the basis of 
the expert’s opinion and a limiting instruction was given to the jury). 
 124 See Heather E. Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, “Far from the Turbulent Space”: 
Considering the Adequacy of Counsel in the Representation of Individuals Accused of 
Being Sexually Violent Predators, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 125, 142 (2015); see also 
People v. Ward, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 832 (Ct. App. 1999) (“In civil commitment cases, 
where the trier of fact is required by statute to determine whether a person is . . . likely to 
be dangerous, expert prediction may be the only evidence available.”). 
 125 See Eric S. Janus, Closing Pandora’s Box: Sexual Predators and the Politics of 
Sexual Abuse, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2004); John L. Schwab, Due Process 
and “The Worst of the Worst”: Mental Competence in Sexually Violent Predator Civil 
Commitment Proceedings, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 912, 914 (2012). 
 126 See, e.g., People v. Burroughs, 211 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 684 (Ct. App. 2016) (where 
the expert’s basis testimony disclosed details of defendant’s uncharged offenses, “in lurid 
detail” including “the repeated sodomy of a young boy and the use of a knife to penetrate a 
woman”); In re Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d at 547–48 (where the expert’s basis 
testimony disclosed victim statements from uncharged offenses, including those from 
defendant’s own teenage daughter, who stated “her father had masturbated in front of 
her, and made her sit naked while he fondled her breasts and genitals”); see also Smith, 
supra note 110, at 696–700 (stating that victim statements in criminal reports and 
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hearsay details concerning, for example, a defendant’s uncharged 
sex offenses or lewd behavior while in custody, tempts the 
fact-finder to commit the defendant just to punish past 
wrongdoings.127 Significantly, MDO and SVP civil commitment 
trials implicate liberty interests; the trials are not limited by 
double jeopardy and ex post facto protections, meaning liberal 
admission of hearsay contents have serious consequences for 
defendants.128 To ensure the liberty interests of defendants are 
protected, other states should follow a restrictive Sanchez-like 
approach to policing the scope of expert basis testimony in MDO 
and SVP proceedings.  
B. Civil Contexts  
The Sanchez hearsay ruling is equally applicable in civil 
contexts.129 In Sanchez, the court noted that it intended to 
“clarify the proper application of Evidence Code sections 801 and 
802, relating to the scope of expert testimony.”130 California 
Evidence Code sections 801 and 802 govern the admission of 
expert testimony in both criminal and civil cases.131 Nothing in 
the Sanchez opinion indicates the court intended to limit its 
ruling regarding expert basis testimony to criminal cases only.132 
In regards to California civil cases, the Sanchez ruling likely 
will not have as extensive of an impact as it expectedly will in 
criminal cases. This is because California courts have already 
 
reports of uncharged crimes are often used by experts). Also, experts often do not examine 
the defendant themselves because the defendant may refuse to be examined. Id. at 696. 
 127 See Burroughs, 211 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 684 (stating the evidence testified to by the 
expert was “exceedingly inflammatory” because it “depicted [defendant] as someone with 
an irrepressible propensity to commit sexual offenses, and invited the jury to punish him 
for past offenses”). 
 128 MDO offenders are committed for one-year periods and thereafter can be released 
unless the prosecution petitions for recommitment and, each time, proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt the offender should be recommitted for another year. See Lopez v. 
Super. Ct., 239 P.3d 1228, 1233 (Cal. 2010). SVP offenders are committed for an indefinite 
period of time, with annual examinations to determine whether the SVP status 
qualifications continue to be met (subject to continued/recommitment hearings). See CAL. 
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6604, 6604.1, 6605 (West 2017); see also People v. McKee, 223 
P.3d 566, 570–72 (Cal. 2010). “In particular, individuals designated as SVPs are rarely 
released ‘and placement within SVP programs typically amounts to a [life] sentence.’” 
Schwab, supra note 125, at 914 (quoting Corey R. Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on 
Sex Offenders, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 448 (2010)). 
 129 The Sanchez ruling related to the Confrontation Clause will not apply in civil 
contexts because it is based on the state and federal right to confrontation, which only 
applies to criminal defendants and has not been extended to civil cases. See People v. 
Otto, 26 P.3d 1061, 1070 (Cal. 2001). 
 130 People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 324 (Cal. 2016). 
 131 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 300 (West 2017) (“[T]his code applies in every action before 
the Supreme Court or a court of appeal or superior court . . . .”). 
 132 See Burroughs, 211 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 678 n.6. 
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been following a Sanchez-like rule in many civil contexts133 based 
on the holding in Continental Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas 
Corp.134 In Continental Airlines, the expert, an aircraft repair 
estimator, was to testify about the costs of repair for an airplane 
that had been severely damaged in a landing accident.135 The 
expert did not prepare the cost-analysis report he relied upon in 
forming his opinion, but rather two of his employees actually 
gathered and compiled the specific information into the report.136 
The court did not allow the expert to testify as to the specific 
contents of the employees’ report.137 
The Continental Airlines court recognized the distinction 
between allowing “an expert [to] state on direct examination the 
matters on which he relied in forming his opinion,” while at the 
same time, not allowing an expert to “testify as to the details of 
such matters if they [were] otherwise inadmissible.”138 The 
court relied on the rationale that an expert “may not under the 
guise of reasons bring before the jury incompetent hearsay 
evidence.”139 Further, the court stated that an expert “may not 
relate an out-of-court opinion by another expert as independent 
proof of fact.”140 
While the court in Continental Airlines did not touch on 
the distinction between general background information and 
case-specific facts, the hearsay analysis is effectively the same as 
in Sanchez.141 California courts have followed the rule recognized 
by Continental Airlines in a number of civil contexts, including 
 
 133 While beyond the scope of this Comment, it is interesting that a more restrictive 
approach to the scope of expert basis testimony has been applied in California civil cases 
than in criminal cases pre-Sanchez. It is curious that criminal defendants have been 
receiving less protection than civil parties, especially considering the differing 
consequences in criminal versus civil cases, namely liberty interests versus mere 
pecuniary interests. 
 134 Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Ct. App. 
1989). Continental Airlines was a civil suit that alleged negligence, strict liability, deceit, 
breach of warranty, and breach of contract based on an airplane crash involving an 
aircraft that was sold from McDonnell Douglas to Continental Airlines. Id. at 782–83. 
 135 See id. at 792. 
 136 See id. The expert stated that he had seen the report, but did not verify the data 
and numbers or “review them hard” because “[t]hey looked like they were in the 
ballpark.” Id. 
 137 Id. at 794. 
 138 Id. at 793 (quoting Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 369 (Ct. App. 
1981)). 
 139 Cont’l Airlines, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 793. 
 140 Id. at 794 (quoting Mosesian v. Pennwalt Corp., 236 Cal. Rptr. 778, 782 (Ct. 
App. 1987)) (“It is proper to solicit the fact that another expert was consulted to show 
the foundation of the testifying expert’s opinion, but not to reveal the content of the 
hearsay opinion.”). 
 141 See Brazier & Frank, supra note 24. 
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product liability, strict liability, and negligence cases.142 
However, the Sanchez rule may have a noticeable impact on two 
civil contexts in California: (1) certain medical professional 
expert testimony in medical malpractice, and (2) personal injury 
cases, and cases involving valuation of property or services. 
Generally, California courts have not allowed physician 
experts to testify to the hearsay statements of other non-testifying 
physicians in medical malpractice and personal injury cases.143 
But, California courts have allowed a physician expert to testify as 
to the out-of-court opinions of other non-testifying physicians if 
certain “limited admissibility”144 requirements are met.145 
Application of the limited admissibility doctrine has been held to 
be appropriate “in situations where the out-of-court doctors’ 
opinion is truly ‘on a parity with a patient’s history . . . given to 
[the patient’s] physician’ and is ‘a part of the information’ used by 
the physician in ‘diagnosis and treatment.’”146 
Legal scholars have theorized that application of the limited 
admissibility doctrine to physician basis testimony is warranted 
because the testifying doctor relied on the opinions of the other 
doctors in their medical treatment of the patient, and thus the 
law should not prevent the physician from doing the same at 
 
 142 See, e.g., Cantu v. Hermansen, No. B257534, 2015 WL 5008279, at *4 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Aug. 24, 2015) (finding the trial court erred in permitting the expert to testify 
concerning the content of medical records when the medical records were not properly 
admitted independently); Korsak v. Atlas Hotels, Inc., 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 833, 834 (Ct. App. 
1992) (holding the expert could not testify regarding the details of hearsay statements 
from an informal survey the expert conducted about hotel maintenance practices); 
Mosesian v. Pennwalt Corp., 236 Cal. Rptr. 778, 782 (Ct. App. 1987) (“The opinions of the 
six outside experts were unquestionably hearsay opinions. Experts may rely upon hearsay 
in forming opinions. They may not relate an out-of-court opinion by another expert as 
independent proof of fact.”). 
 143 See, e.g., Whitfield v. Roth, 519 P.2d 588, 603 (Cal. 1974) (finding the expert 
doctors could not testify as to the out-of-court statements of other non-testifying doctors to 
show the basis of the experts’ opinions because the statements of the non-testifying 
doctors were hearsay); Jamison v. Lindsay, 166 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(finding the court properly precluded the expert from testifying to the hearsay statements 
of a non-testifying doctor, stating “[o]pinions of out-of-court experts are not admissible to 
show the basis of a testifying expert’s opinion if the witness did not use the opinions of the 
out-of-court [doctor] in the course of treatment or diagnosis of the plaintiff”); Williams v. 
Rizvi, No. F038590, 2003 WL 165017, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2003) (holding that it 
was proper to preclude the expert physician from testifying as to the hearsay contents of 
the excluded portions of an operative report). 
 144 When referring to the doctrine of limited admissibility, I am referring to the 
doctrine as it was applied to physician basis testimony in Kelley v. Bailey, 11 Cal. Rptr. 
448, 454–55 (Ct. App. 1961), not the general application of the doctrine of limited 
admissibility as stated in CAL. EVID. CODE § 355 (West 2017). 
 145 It should be noted that this limited admissibility applies only to expert witnesses 
testifying as treating doctors, not to doctors who are consulted solely to render expert 
opinions. See Trannguyen v. Laska, No. B172741, 2004 WL 2498279, at *8–9 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Nov. 8, 2004). 
 146 Whitfield, 519 P.2d at 603 n.26 (quoting Kelley, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 455). 
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trial.147 However, the logic behind the Sanchez rule would seem 
to render evidence that falls within the doctrine of limited 
admissibility inadmissible in the post-Sanchez world. This is 
because the expert medical professional’s testimony is relating 
case-specific hearsay from a different (non-testifying) medical 
professional.148 Further, relating the non-testifying doctor’s 
opinion, which is identical to the expert’s opinion, naturally 
bolsters and fortifies the opinion of the testifying expert.149  
When the doctrine of limited admissibility is applied, a 
limiting instruction is given instructing the jury to consider the 
evidence for the “narrow and limited purpose” of disclosing the 
“information upon which the physician based his diagnosis and 
treatment [on],” and “not as independent proof of the facts.”150 
While the Sanchez court did not address medical expert basis 
testimony detailing case-specific statements of a non-testifying 
physician, the Sanchez rule likely now dictates exclusion of such 
testimony, since admission of case-specific out-of-court statements 
coupled with a limiting instruction mirrors the exact paradigm 
the Sanchez court rendered untenable. 
In regards to expert basis testimony concerning valuation of 
property and services, California courts have somewhat 
consistently allowed property valuation experts to testify to the 
details upon which the expert’s opinion is based, even if such 
details are hearsay.151 Often, a valuation expert’s testimony will 
 
 147 See Volek, supra note 44, at 966–67. 
 148 The court’s rationale for allowing the evidence in this limited capacity is because 
the evidence “stands on a parity with a patient’s history of an accident and ensuing 
injuries given to his physician. It is admissible not as independent proof of the facts but as 
a part of the information upon which the physician based his diagnosis and treatment, if 
any.” Springer v. Reimers, 84 Cal. Rptr. 486, 494 (Ct. App. 1970) (allowing an expert to 
testify to the contents of hearsay statements from a non-testifying doctor’s report based 
on the limited admissibility doctrine rationale). 
 149 Cf. Whitfield, 519 P.2d at 604 (stating the testimony of the testifying doctors “as to 
the views of the 54 [non-testifying] doctors they respectively consulted was actually 
offered to establish the opinion of such latter doctors”); Williams v. Rizvi, No. F038590, 
2003 WL 165017, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2003) (“[T]he only purpose in plaintiff’s 
expert testifying to the excluded portions of [the non-testifying doctor’s] operative report 
would be to bolster the opinion of plaintiff’s expert.”). 
 150 Kelley, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 455. 
 151 See, e.g., Appel v. Burman, 206 Cal. Rptr. 259, 263–64 (Ct. App. 1984) (allowing an 
architect expert to testify as to the details of a cost estimate report performed by a non-
testifying cost estimator); McElligott v. Freeland, 33 P.2d 430, 436–37 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1934) (allowing an accounting expert to testify as to the details of the hearsay information 
he based his property valuation on); see also Burow v. JTL Dev. Corp., Inc., 2d Civil No. 
B227256, 2012 WL 34384, at *3–4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2012) (allowing the expert to 
testify as to the details of data and laboratory tests conducted by a non-testifying engineer 
in opining on a measurement of future soil consolidation); Blakenbaker v. Ingram, No. 
E033930, 2005 WL 40033, at *2–3 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2005) (finding an accident 
reconstructionist expert’s testimony relating the measurements of crush damage to a car 
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be derived from predominantly inadmissible hearsay sources.152 
Therefore, in order to inform the fact-finder of the information 
relied upon to assist in weighing the expert’s credibility, 
California courts have held that an expert “should, so far as is 
practicable, detail the facts upon which his conclusion or 
judgment is based even though the facts upon which he relies 
would be incompetent to affect value in the particular case.”153 
The California courts’ rationale in finding the hearsay facts are 
reliable is that the valuation expert evaluates the hearsay and 
“gives the sanction of his general experience.”154 
In Sanchez, the court pointed out that under the common 
law, property valuation experts were one of the exceptions to 
the general rule barring disclosure of otherwise inadmissible 
case-specific hearsay.155 The justification for this exception was 
threefold: (1) the hearsay was of routine use by the expert in 
their conduct outside the courtroom; (2) the expert had 
experience in evaluating the hearsay sources’ trustworthiness; 
and (3) the court did not want to needlessly complicate the 
process of proof.156 The legislature’s codification of the California 
Evidence Code generalized this common law exception with 
courts employing reliability as the key inquiry as to whether 
expert basis testimony may be admitted.157 
However, under Sanchez, a more cut-and-dry rule has 
emerged; reliability is no longer the key determination as to 
whether disclosure of the case-specific facts will be permitted.158 
Sanchez dictates that “[i]f it is a case-specific fact and the witness 
has no personal knowledge of it, if no hearsay exception applies, 
and if the expert treats the fact as true, the expert simply may 
not testify about it.”159 Sanchez made no indication that it 
intended to leave the traditional common law exceptions in place, 
 
taken by a non-testifying individual to opine on the speed of a vehicle admissible to show 
the basis of the expert’s opinion). 
 152 See McElligott, 33 P.2d at 436. In property valuation cases, the basis of the 
expert’s opinion may be based on inquires made of others, commercial circulars, 
correspondence, newspapers, market quotations or reports, price lists, current prices, 
comparable sales, relevant sales known to the expert, and other secondary sources. See 31 
CAL. JUR. 3D EVID. § 712 (2017); see also People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 328 (Cal. 2016).  
 153 Appel, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (quoting McElligott, 33 P.2d at 436). 
 154 Appel, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (citing McElligott, 33 P.2d at 437). 
 155 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 328. The court stated the other common law exception was 
physicians who relied on patients’ hearsay to form diagnoses. Id. at 329. 
 156 Id. at 329 (quoting KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, at 155). 
 157 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 329. 
 158 Id.; see also Stamps, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 834 (Ct. App. 2016) (“After Sanchez, 
reliability is no longer the sole touchstone of admissibility where expert testimony to 
hearsay is at issue. Admissibility—at least where ‘case-specific hearsay’ is concerned—is 
now more cut-and-dried.”). 
 159 Stamps, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 834. 
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and thus its holding suggests that the practice of allowing basis 
disclosure, in its entirety, is no longer tenable because the 
“expert’s testimony regarding the basis for an opinion must be 
considered for its truth by the jury.”160  
Accordingly, it appears the Sanchez rule encompasses the 
disclosure of case-specific facts forming the basis of a valuation 
expert’s opinion. The expert’s valuation price of the property or 
services is inarguably case-specific, since it is often the ultimate 
issue in a case and is the principal matter the expert was called 
to give an opinion on.161 
Of course, the Sanchez rule does not alter the established rule 
that valuation experts may rely on hearsay sources that would 
otherwise be inadmissible, provided that it is of a type reasonably 
relied upon by experts in the given field.162 However, Sanchez 
arguably dictates that valuation experts can now do no more than 
generally state what they relied upon in forming the basis of their 
opinions; meaning the experts cannot disclose the case-specific 
details of such hearsay information—which could include, for 
example, reports or price lists prepared by others, conversations 
with others, and newspaper advertisements—unless such 
information falls under a hearsay exception or has been properly 
admitted independent of the experts’ opinions.163 Therefore, 
post-Sanchez, a valuation expert will likely no longer be able to 
disclose case-specific hearsay contents forming the basis of their 
opinion. This holds true even if the hearsay is of a type reasonably 
relied upon by experts in the given field or because it is a general 
practice in the industry to use content prepared by others without 
complying with the requirements Sanchez mandates.164 
While California has generally followed a Sanchez-like rule 
in many civil contexts, other states have liberally allowed experts 
 
 160 Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 330. 
 161 See McElligott v. Freeland, 33 P.2d 430, 437 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934) (“[T]he testimony 
of the witness wherein he related [hearsay statements from an informal survey he 
conducted] . . . was given in response to a question which was preliminary to the matter 
upon which he was called to give his opinion.”). 
 162 See Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 334 (“Any expert may still rely on hearsay in forming an 
opinion, and may tell the jury in general terms that he did so . . . [by] relat[ing] generally 
the kind and source of the ‘matter’ upon which his opinion rests.”); see also Appel v. 
Burman, 206 Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 (Ct. App. 1984) (“It has long been held in this state that 
an expert opinion on the valuation of property or services may be based in whole or in 
part on hearsay publications.”). 
 163 See Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 334 (“There is a distinction to be made between 
allowing an expert to describe the type or source of the matter relied upon as opposed 
to presenting, as fact, case-specific hearsay that does not otherwise fall under a 
statutory period.”). 
 164 Cf. Appel, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (finding expert’s disclosure of hearsay information 
admissible because the expert “testified that it is the general practice in his industry to 
use a cost estimator to perform the actual mathematical computation of an estimate”). 
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in civil cases to testify to case-specific hearsay facts forming the 
basis of an experts’ opinion.165 Some states’ evidence codes, 
such as Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas, statutorily 
allow for disclosure of an experts’ basis, even if such testimony 
is otherwise inadmissible hearsay.166 Other states, whose state 
evidence codes are similar to that of Federal Rule of Evidence 
703, allow for the disclosure of an experts’ basis, even if such 
testimony is otherwise admissible hearsay, subject to a 
balancing of the prejudicial effect versus probative value of the 
basis testimony.167 
For example, states such as Arkansas, Arizona, Illinois, 
Georgia, Ohio, Texas, and Washington, have allowed experts to 
testify to case-specific hearsay statements in civil contexts, 
including personal injury, negligence, medical malpractice, and 
products liability cases.168 Further, states such as Arkansas, 
 
 165 For a comparison of states that permit an expert to testify to hearsay matters 
forming the basis of the expert’s opinion to states that do not allow the expert to testify to 
the hearsay forming the expert’s basis, see 89 A.L.R. 4TH 456, § 3–4 (2011) (originally 
published in 1991). 
 166 See PA. STAT. AND CONST. STAT. ANN. § 705 (West 2017) (“If an expert states an 
opinion the expert must state the facts or data on which the opinion is based.”); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. § 703 (West 2017) (“If of a type reasonably and customarily relied upon by 
experts in the particular field in forming opinions upon the subject, the underlying facts 
or data shall be admissible without testimony from the primary source.”); TEX. EVID. 
CODE ANN. § 705(d) (West 2017) (“If the court allows the [expert] to disclose [the 
underlying] facts or data the court must . . . restrict the evidence to its proper scope and 
instruct the jury accordingly.”). 
 167 Compare FED. R. EVID. 703 (“[I]f the facts or data would otherwise be 
inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their 
probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their 
prejudicial effect.”), with e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 703 (West 2017) (same as Federal 
Rule 703), and Ga. Code Ann. § 24-7-703 (West 2017) (“[F]acts or data that are otherwise 
inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the [expert] . . . unless . . . their 
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially 
outweighs their prejudicial effect.”). 
 168 See, e.g., Lawhon v. Ayres Corp., 992 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999) (“[A]n 
expert must be allowed to disclose to the trier of fact the factual basis for his opinion 
because the opinion would otherwise be left unsupported, and the trier of fact would be 
left with little if any means of evaluating its correctness.”); Nunez v. Prof’l Transit Mgmt. 
of Tucson, Inc., No. 2 CA-CV 2010-0201, 2011 WL 1998433, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. May, 18 
2011) (allowing the expert to testify to the hearsay statements of a non-testifying 
individual’s unsworn written declaration, which was not otherwise admissible); Ziekert v. 
Cox, 538 N.E.2d 751, 757 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that “not only may experts consider 
medical records commonly relied upon by members of the medical profession in forming 
their opinions, but that they may testify as to the contents of those records as well” 
because the contents are admitted “not to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein, 
but for the limited purpose of the explaining the expert’s testimony”) (quoting Roebuck v. 
State, 586 S.E.2d 651, 655 (Ga. 2003)); Thomas v. Metro. Atl. Rapid Transit Auth., 684 
S.E.2d 83, 87–88 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (allowing the expert to testify as to hearsay and 
inadmissible attachments based on the rationale that “[a]n expert may base his opinion 
on hearsay and may be allowed to testify as to the basis for his findings” because any 
hearsay issue “presents a jury question as to the weight [that] should be assigned [to] the 
opinion”); Fry v. King, 950 N.E.2d 229, 231–38 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (allowing the expert 
to testify as to facts and data prepared by others because the expert verified the facts and 
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Arizona, Georgia, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and Washington, 
have allowed experts to testify to case-specific hearsay 
statements in valuation and appraisal contexts.169  
Generally, these states have allowed experts to disclose 
case-specific hearsay basis testimony based on four different 
rationales: (1) the testimony is not hearsay because it is not 
coming in for the truth, but rather the limited purpose of showing 
the basis forming the expert’s opinion;170 (2) the testimony is 
hearsay, but needs to be disclosed to the jury in order for the jury 
to assign weight to the expert’s opinion;171 (3) the testimony is 
hearsay, but the expert’s experience in evaluating the hearsay 
material renders the information reliable, and thus any 
inaccuracies go to the weight of the expert’s credibility;172 and (4) 
the testimony is hearsay, but a limiting instruction and balancing 
test cures any potential hearsay problems.173 
The holding in Sanchez rejects each of these admittance 
rationales. Experts are used extremely often in civil cases, almost 
 
data by use of Google Earth based on the reasoning that any inaccuracies go to the weight 
of the testimony, and not the admissibility); Stam v. Mack, 984 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1999) (allowing a physician expert to testify as to the details of a non-testifying 
physician’s opinion because the state evidence rules “allow a testifying expert to relate on 
direct examination the reasonably reliable facts and data on which he relied in forming 
his opinion” subject to a limiting instruction and balancing test); Allen v. Asbestos Corp., 
157 P.3d 406, 413 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (allowing the expert to testify as to otherwise 
inadmissible hearsay facts because “[t]he otherwise inadmissible facts or data underlying 
an expert’s opinion [are] admissible for the limited purpose of explaining the basis of an 
expert’s opinion, but [are] not substantive evidence”). 
 169 See, e.g., Ark. State Highway Comm’n v. Schell, 683 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 1985) (stating that “an expert must be allowed to disclose to the trier of fact the 
basis for his opinion, as otherwise the opinion is left unsupported in midair with little if 
any means for evaluating its correctness”); Town of Gilbert v. Freeman, No. 1A-CV09-
0660, 2010 WL 5018514, at *5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (allowing the expert to testify to 
hearsay details based on the rationale that the disclosure of hearsay facts or data not 
admitted in evidence go to the credibility of the expert’s opinion, not the truth of the 
matter asserted); King v. Browning, 268 S.E.2d 653, 655 (Ga. 1980) (allowing a surveyor 
expert to testify to hearsay facts because “[a]n expert may base his opinion on hearsay 
and may be allowed to testify as to the basis for his findings”); Williamson v. Harvey 
Smith, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 151, 155 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (allowing the expert to testify to the 
details of a report prepared by another inspector); Martin v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 953 
So.2d 1163, 1167 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Bishop v. Miss. Trans. Comm’n, 734 So.2d 
218, 221 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)) (allowing a valuation expert to testify to details of another 
non-testifying expert because “a witness is not a mere conduit, if the ‘expertise of the 
testifying witness is such as to permit that witness’s adoption of the statements of a 
similar expert’”); Barrack v. Kolea, 651 A.2d 149, 155–56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (allowing 
the expert to testify as to the details of cost figures prepared by his non-testifying 
subcontractors); Deep Water Brewing, LLC v. Fairway Res. Ltd., 215 P.3d 990, 1014 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (allowing the appraiser expert to testify as to the details of past 
appraisal reports prepared by non-testifying experts). 
 170 See, e.g., Ziekert, 538 N.E.2d at 757; Town of Gilbert, 2010 WL 5018514, at *5.  
 171 See, e.g., Lawhon, 992 S.W.2d at 166; Thomas, 684 S.E.2d at 88. 
 172 See, e.g., Martin, 953 So.2d at 1167; Deep Water Brewing, 215 P.3d at 1014; Fry, 
950 N.E.2d at 236. 
 173 See, e.g., Stam, 984 S.W.2d at 750. 
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universally when it comes to quantifying value and damages, and 
are often a necessary and critical part of litigation because expert 
testimony can help the fact-finder understand complex facts and 
issues.174 Because experts offer testimony that is often central to 
the question of liability in a case,175 the need for jurors to have all 
the information forming the basis of an expert’s opinion becomes 
obvious; jurors need to assess the expert’s credibility when 
deciding the outcome of a case. 
However, Sanchez exposes the issues that arise if experts are 
permitted to relate otherwise inadmissible basis testimony to the 
fact-finder: When experts treat hearsay statements as true and 
accurate in forming the basis of their opinion, jurors must accept 
the hearsay statements as true if they believe the expert is 
credible, and thus the statements are inescapably being admitted 
for their truth.176 The Sanchez court realized that merely telling 
the jury that the expert relied on additional information in 
general terms, as opposed to reciting the details, might do less to 
bolster the credibility and weight of the expert’s opinion.177 
However, this point confirms the case-specific hearsay, if 
admitted, is in fact being considered for its truth. If admittance 
bolsters the expert’s opinion, “[t]he expert is essentially telling 
the jury: ‘You should accept my opinion because it is reliable in 
light of these facts on which I rely.’”178 Because it cannot logically 
be maintained that the case-specific hearsay statements are not 
being admitted for their truth, and it is dangerously likely the 
fact-finder is considering such hearsay statements for their 
truth179, other states should follow the Sanchez rule.180  
 
 174 See Greg Eastman, Vandy M. Howell & Maria Salgado, A Primer on When to 
Use Expert Witnesses and How to Find Them, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 7, 2013), 
https://www.bna.com/a-primer-on-when-to-use-expert-witnesses-and-how-to-find-them/ 
[http://perma.cc/R45D-UUDX]. 
 175 See id. 
 176 See People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 334 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 New York, for example, already follows a Sanchez-like rule based on the reasoning 
in the 2005 case People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 729–33 (N.Y. 2005), which 
disallowed a physiatrist expert from testifying to the details of interviews with third 
parties forming the basis of the expert’s opinion regarding the defendant’s sanity. The 
New York court reasoned: 
We do not see how the jury could use the statements of the interviewees to 
evaluate [the expert’s] opinion without accepting as a premise either that the 
statements were true or that they were false. Since the prosecution’s goal was 
to buttress [the expert’s] opinion, the prosecution obviously wanted and 
expected the jury to take the statements as true. 
Id. at 732. 
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III. SANCHEZ AND FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 703 
California’s restrictive Sanchez method in policing the scope 
of expert basis testimony differs from the current federal method. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 703 currently states: 
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the 
expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in 
the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or 
data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible 
for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise 
be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the 
jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the 
opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.181 
Thus, the current federal rule, while taking an approach that 
favors exclusion, allows experts to relate case-specific hearsay for 
the purpose of assisting the jury in evaluating the expert’s 
opinion if the hearsay content’s probative value in assisting the 
jury in weighing the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs the 
risk of prejudice resulting from the jury’s potential misuse of the 
information.182 If the court determines the hearsay contents can 
be admitted, Rule 703 requires a limiting instruction, upon 
request, instructing the jury not to use the information as 
substantive evidence.183 
In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court grappled with the same 
hearsay issue that was presented in Sanchez—the admissibility 
of expert basis testimony disclosing inadmissible hearsay—albeit 
in a federal Confrontation Clause context in Williams v. 
Illinois.184 Williams was a criminal rape prosecution in which the 
identity of the offender was a central issue.185 DNA evidence was 
collected from the victim and sent to an outside laboratory for 
analysis.186 Independent of the rape case, the defendant’s DNA 
was in the state’s police database.187 The prosecution called an 
expert who testified that she compared the DNA sample from the 
outside laboratory to the known DNA sample of the defendant, 
concluding the two DNA samples matched.188 The issue 
presented to the Court was whether the details of the outside 
laboratory’s DNA analysis report, forming the basis of the 
 
 181 FED. R. EVID. 703 (emphasis added). 
 182 Id. (advisory committee’s note to the 2000 Amendment). 
 183 See id. 
 184 See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 56 (2012). 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 59. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. at 60. 
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expert’s opinion, were inadmissible hearsay.189 A four-member 
plurality opined the expert’s testimony regarding the contents of 
the outside laboratory’s DNA report was non-hearsay, and thus 
admissible, since it was admitted to help the fact-finder assess 
the expert’s testimony, and not for its truth.190 However, five 
justices (a four-member dissent and a one-member concurrence 
writing separately) specifically rejected the plurality’s “not-for-
truth” rationale.191 Justice Thomas’s concurrence stated that the 
expert’s testimony did not merely reveal the opinion basis 
because the validity of the expert’s opinion “ultimately turned on 
the truth of [the hearsay] statements.”192 Similarly, the dissent 
stated, in order “to determinate the validity of the [expert’s] 
conclusion, the factfinder must assess the truth of the out-of-
court statement on which it relies,” which contributed to the 
dissent’s consensus that the “not-for-truth” rationale is “very 
weak, factually implausible, nonsense, and a sheer fiction.”193 It 
is the analysis of these five justices in Williams that directly 
influenced the Sanchez court’s ruling.194 
Despite the strong opinions of a majority of justices in the 
Williams case regarding the flaws of the “not-for-truth” rationale, 
 
 189 And, further, the Court was presented with the question of whether the admission 
of the expert’s testimony violated the Federal Confrontation Clause. Id. at 57. 
 190 The plurality further held this type of expert testimony does not violate the 
Federal Confrontation Clause because the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation has no 
application to out-of-court statements that are not offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. Id. A five-justice majority (the four-member plurality and Justice Thomas) 
opined that the independent laboratory report was not testimonial and thus mooted the 
Rule 703 issue. Id. at 85–86, 97 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 191 See generally id. at 103–40 (referring to Justice Thomas’s concurrence and 
Justice Kagan’s dissent, with whom Justice Scalia, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice 
Sotomayor joined). 
 192 Id. at 108 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating the “not-for-truth” rational 
“overlook[ed] that the value of [the expert’s] testimony depended on the truth of those 
very assumptions”). 
 193 Id. at 125–28 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, § 4.10.1 
(2d ed. 2011)). The dissent went on to illustrate the flaw in the “not-for-truth” rationale: 
The Confrontation Clause prevented the State from introducing that report 
into evidence except by calling to the stand the person who prepared it. So the 
State tried another route—introducing the substance of the report as part and 
parcel of an expert witness’s conclusion. In effect, [the expert] testified . . . “I 
concluded that Williams was the rapist because [the outside laboratory], an 
accredited and trustworthy laboratory, says that the rapist has a particular 
DNA profile and, look, Williams has an identical one. . . .” Nothing in [the 
expert’s] testimony indicates that she was making an assumption or 
considering a hypothesis. To the contrary, [the expert] affirmed, without 
qualification, that the Cellmark report showed a “male DNA profile found in 
semen from the vaginal swabs of [the victim].” 
Id. at 111–30. 
 194 See People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 330–33 (Cal. 2016) (discussing the opinions of 
the five justices in Williams who expressly rejected the “not-for-truth” rationale, stating 
“[w]e find persuasive the reasoning of a majority of justices in Williams”). 
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some federal courts have allowed experts to relate otherwise 
inadmissible hearsay evidence to the fact-finder on the grounds 
the evidence is being admitted solely to assist the fact-finder in 
evaluating the expert’s opinion.195 On the other hand, some 
federal courts have not permitted experts to testify to 
case-specific hearsay evidence on the grounds the hearsay 
contents are more prejudicial than probative under Rule 703.196 
Legal scholars have also diverged on whether experts in federal 
courts should be able to testify to case-specific facts from 
otherwise inadmissible hearsay sources.197 Thus, there has been 
 
 195 See, e.g., U.S. v. NCR Corp., 960 F. Supp. 2d 793, 834–36 (E.D. Wis. 2013) 
(allowing the expert to testify regarding the details of a report prepared by others because 
it is customary for experts in this field to rely on and adopt such reports in forming their 
opinion, even though the expert is unfamiliar with the details of how such a report is 
made); In re Moyer, 421 B.R. 587, 596–97 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007) (allowing the expert to 
testify to the hearsay details of a report, stating that “[w]hile, normally the Report itself 
would be inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 703 as hearsay, the Court finds it 
admissible to explain the basis of [the expert’s] opinion, not as substantive evidence”); 
Geyer v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 3d 1212, 1216–18 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (allowing a 
physician expert, who did not examine the plaintiff, to testify to hearsay details of medical 
records and reports prepared by non-testifying physicians); Westfield Ins. Co. v. Harris, 
134 F.3d 608, 611–13 (4th Cir. 1998) (allowing Fire Marshall expert to testify to the 
hearsay details of reports made by the insurance company investigator and discussions 
with the expert’s subordinates); U.S. v. Wolling, 223 Fed. Appx. 610, 612 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(allowing a defense expert to describe the hearsay contents of medical reports that were 
excluded from being admitted into evidence under the Rule 703 balancing test); In re 
Amey, 40 A.3d 902, 914–15 (D.C. 2012) (allowing psychiatrist to testify to the hearsay 
contents forming the basis of the expert’s opinion, including reports and notes prepared 
by other doctors because a limiting instruction was given to the jury). 
 196 See, e.g., McDevitt v. Guenther, 522 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1294 (D. Haw. 2007) 
(holding that, while it is permissible for the expert to base his opinion on otherwise 
inadmissible hearsay, “the facts on which [the expert] bases his opinion are also the facts 
in dispute before the factfinder in this case” and “[f]or this reason, the probative value of 
any inadmissible facts would be outweighed by . . . the prejudicial effect of having an 
expert recite inadmissible facts as though they are established”); Loeffel Steel Prods., Inc. 
v. Delta Brands, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 794, 808 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“Rule 703 was . . . not 
intended to abolish the hearsay rule and to allow a witness, under the guise of giving 
expert testimony, to in effect become the mouthpiece of the witnesses on whose 
statements or opinions the expert purports to base his opinion.”); Mike’s Train House, Inc. 
v. Lionel, LLC, 472 F.3d 398, 409 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that it was error to allow an 
expert to testify as to the hearsay details of another non-testifying expert’s conclusions 
and the degree to which the expert’s and the non-testifying expert’s conclusions 
overlapped); U.S. v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 197–99 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that it was error 
to allow the expert to recite hearsay statements from otherwise inadmissible interviews). 
 197 Compare KAYE ET AL., supra note 18, at 179–80 (“To admit basis testimony for the 
nonhearsay purpose of jury evaluation of the experts is therefore to ignore the reality that 
jury evaluation of the expert requires a direct assessment of the truth of the expert’s 
basis. Having invited the jury to make such an assessment, is it either fair or practical 
then to ask the jury to turn around and ignore it?”), Ronald L. Carlson, Experts as 
Hearsay Conduits: Confrontation Abuses in Opinion Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 481, 493 
(1992) (arguing that a restrictive approach to policing the bases of modern expert 
testimony should be implemented to bar “[d]etailed renditions[s] of unauthenticated 
hearsay” and to curb Rule 703 abuses), Daniel D. Blinka, Ethical Firewalls, Limited 
Admissibility, and Rule 703, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1229, 1257–58 (2007) (stating that it 
seems unlikely the amended Rule 703 has resulted in fewer rulings permitting disclosure 
for the limited purpose of better understanding the expert’s reasoning because, in certain 
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much controversy over Rule 703 as it relates to the disclosure of 
expert basis testimony. 
The Sanchez rule excluding all expert basis testimony that 
relates case-specific hearsay takes a far more restrictive approach 
than the federal rule in that it completely rejects the “not-for-
truth” rationale, disallows the use of a limiting instruction, and 
eliminates the use of the balancing test in determining 
admissibility. It is unclear whether the ruling in Sanchez will 
influence the ongoing federal debate. The 2000 Amendment to 
Rule 703 favoring inadmissibility seems to suggest the Federal 
courts are at least somewhat concerned with the potential for 
jurors to improperly consider expert testimony.198 The Advisory 
Committee’s note makes clear the amendment to Rule 703 was 
intended to emphasize the “underlying information [forming the 
basis of the expert’s opinion] is not admissible simply because the 
opinion or inference is admitted.”199 Moreover, it appears the 
dominant view expressed in legal literature seems to reject the 
“not-for-truth” rationale, just as the Sanchez court did.200 Thus, 
perhaps it is just a matter of time before federal courts adopt a 
Sanchez-like bright-line approach when it comes the disclosure of 
hearsay evidence forming the basis of an expert’s opinion. 
 
situations, the jury’s need for the basis evidence would likely substantially outweigh the 
prejudicial effect of the hearsay in light of the court’s limiting instructions), Mark I. 
Bernstein, Jury Evaluation of Expert Testimony Under the Federal Rules, 7 DREXEL L. 
REV. 239, 286 (2015) (“The procedures adopted by the Federal Rules of Evidence on expert 
testimony violate a fundamental logical concept . . . when the factual basis is revealed by 
the expert . . . was to be ‘cured’ by the logically inconsistent, totally ineffectual, judicial 
instruction to restrict use of the factual basis evidence only to ‘evaluate the expert’s 
opinion’ and not for the truth of any of the facts relied upon.”), and Volek, supra note 147, 
at 996–97 (stating that “[t]he limiting instruction contemplated by Rule 703 is 
problematic” because “the jury must somehow use the inadmissible basis evidence to 
evaluate the expert’s opinion, without considering whether or not the inadmissible basis 
evidence is true”), with Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion 
Testimony: A Response to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583, 584 (1987) (arguing 
that “the introduction of the inadmissible facts or data upon which experts rely no more 
violates the hearsay rule’s spirit than do the volumes of evidence that regularly are 
introduced through the numerous hearsay rule exceptions”), and Alexander J. Toney, The 
Credibility-Based Evaluative Purpose: Why Rule 703 Disclosures Don’t Offend the 
Confrontation Clause, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 953, 1000 (2015) (“Rule 703 is no sinister 
device for admitting evidence when no other provision allows it . . . . [T]he Rule’s purpose, 
to offer jurors indicia for assessing the credibility—and, by proxy, the correctness—of 
expert testimony, is a real purpose, and one that serves the interests of justice.”). 
 198 FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note to the 2000 Amendment (“The 
amendment provides a presumption against disclosure to the jury of information used as 
the basis of an expert’s opinion and is not admissible for any substantive purpose, when 
that information is offered by the proponent of the expert.”). 
 199 Id.  
 200 See Toney, supra note 197, at 984–85 (citing to treatises, law review articles, and 
Professor Richard Friedman’s amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Williams v. Illinois to support the inference that the view that juries must consider basis 
evidence for its truth is the dominant view in the federal realm). 
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CONCLUSION 
Prior to People v. Sanchez, California courts have long 
tolerated experts disclosing to the jury case-specific out-of-court 
statements forming the basis of the expert’s opinion under the 
guise that the statements were being offered for the sole purpose 
of explaining the expert’s opinion basis, and that, in most 
instances, a limiting instruction could cure any hearsay 
problems.201 Sanchez struck down this paradigm, holding the 
expert’s testimony regarding the basis for the opinion must be 
considered for its truth by the jury and the jury’s evaluation of an 
expert’s opinion requires a direct assessment of the truth of the 
basis forming the expert’s opinion.202 Post-Sanchez, an expert 
may no longer relate to the jury case-specific out-of-court 
statements when, to support the expert’s opinion, the expert 
treats the content of the statements as true and accurate.203 Such 
statements are hearsay and to be admissible, must fall within a 
firmly rooted hearsay exception or be properly admitted 
independent of the expert’s testimony.204 
What does this mean for California trial practice? Trial 
counsel now must devote greater attention to establishing a 
proper evidentiary basis for any case-specific out-of-court 
statements they intend their expert to assume, disclose, and 
opine on. California courts will have to act as stricter gatekeepers 
in policing the disclosure of expert basis testimony, and will 
likely face much stricter appellate review in such matters.205 If 
trial counsel cannot independently admit the case-specific facts, 
or the case-specific facts do not fall under an applicable hearsay 
exception, an expert will likely only be able to communicate in 
general, admittedly vague, terms the basis for their opinion, and 
hope the jury will trust and believe the expert.206 In upcoming 
cases, it is likely there will be much litigation over what 
constitutes a case-specific fact.207 Moreover, courts will likely also 
 
 201 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
 202 See People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320, 333 (Cal. 2016). 
 203 Id. at 334. 
 204 Id. at 333 (“Like any other hearsay evidence [the out-of-court statements] must be 
admitted through an applicable hearsay exception. Alternatively, the evidence can be 
admitted through an appropriate witness and the expert may assume its truth in a 
properly worded hypothetical question.”). 
 205 Of course, any Sanchez challenge must survive a harmless error analysis. 
 206 See, e.g., People v. Atkins, No. B278735, 2017 WL 3587418, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Aug. 21, 2017) (finding no Sanchez violation because the expert merely recited in general 
terms the basis for his opinion was conversations with other gang detectives, and offered 
no specific details concerning those communications). 
 207 For example, in order to obtain a gang enhancement conviction, one element the 
prosecution must prove is that members of the gang have engaged in a pattern of criminal 
gang activity by committing two or more “predicate offenses” (which are statutorily 
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grapple with determining what basis testimony qualifies as 
revealing the general “kind and source of the matter” upon which 
the expert relied,208 without disclosing too much information so 
as to violate the Sanchez rule. 
The Sanchez hearsay rule implications extend and apply 
equally in both criminal and civil contexts in California.209 While 
some states, such as New York, already follow a restrictive 
Sanchez-like approach when it comes to the scope of expert basis 
testimony, many other states have rather consistently allowed 
liberal disclosure of expert basis testimony, opening the 
flood-gates to experts smuggling otherwise inadmissible hearsay 
evidence to the jury.210 In regards to federal courts, while Rule 
703 presumes inadmissibility but allows admissibility in certain 
circumstances, there has been great tension concerning how 
much, if any, substantive hearsay detail an expert may relate to 
the fact-finder as opinion basis testimony.211 Perhaps California’s 
return to the restrictive approach to policing the scope of expert 
basis testimony will encourage other states, as well as federal 
courts, to become stricter gatekeepers, thereby curbing the 
practice of using experts to smuggle otherwise inadmissible 
hearsay contents before the ears of the fact-finder. 
 
enumerated offenses). See Sanchez, 374 P.3d at 342–43. It is unclear from the ruling in 
Sanchez whether predicate offenses constitute general background information about the 
gang in question or case-specific facts. Can the prosecution elicit details of these predicate 
offenses when such information is not based on the expert’s personal knowledge and not 
admitted independent of the expert? If the predicate offense testimony is considered to be 
general background information about the gang, if the predicate offense happens to 
involve the specific defendant in the case, does this fact shift the testimony from general 
background information to case-specific facts? Compare e.g., People v. Vasquez, No. 
C069228, 2017 WL 3699636, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2017) (holding testimony 
detailing predicate offenses were “more akin to general background information 
concerning the gang” as the predicate convictions did not involve the defendant), and 
People v. Chavez, No. C074316, 2016 WL 5940068, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2016) 
(finding testimony regarding predicate offenses did not involve the defendant or events 
involved in the case, and thus were not case-specific, but rather general background 
information concerning the gang), with People v. Lara, 215 Cal. Rptr. 3d 91, 126–27 (Ct. 
App. 2017) (determining the gang expert’s testimony regarding the predicate offenses, 
which involved the defendant, were case-specific facts), and People v. Carrillo, No. 
F070459, 2017 WL 2463468, at *23 (Cal. Ct. App. June 7, 2017) (holding testimony 
detailing predicate offenses involving defendant were case-specific facts, not general 
background information). 
 208 Id. at 685–86 (“Any expert may still rely on hearsay in forming an opinion, and 
may tell the jury in general terms that he did so . . . [by] relat[ing] generally the kind and 
source of the ‘matter’ upon which his opinion rests.”). 
 209 See supra Sections II(A) and II(B). 
 210 See supra Sections II(A) and II(B). 
 211 See supra Part III. 
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